Contract labour act in India: a pragmatic view

In order to surpass the stringent regulations, the industry sector in India is largely resorting to contract labourers, who are governed by an Act. A primary survey carried out in an industrially developed state in India, reveals that several stipulations made in the Act are not followed. The workers felt that collusive agreement between the labour inspector, and the entrepreneur (or the contractor) has aided the violation of law. We consider a game theoretic model of Marjit, Rajeev and Mukherjee (2000) to show why such an act is optimal and examine whether any provision of reward for the inspector independent of fines collected by him would help to protect the law.

Suggested Citation

Download full text from publisher

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS

  1. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. " Notes on bribery and the control of corruption ," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
  2. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1992. " Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law ," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 556-565, June.
  3. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 2004. " Can Labor Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India ," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 91-134.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

  1. repec:ilo:ilowps:466556 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Daniel Schwab, 2019. " Labor protection laws and the drain on productivity: Evidence from India ," Working Papers 1906, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  3. Daniel Schwab, 2020. " Labor protection laws and the drain on productivity: Evidence from India ," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 383-401, May.
  4. Basu, Arnab K. & Chau, Nancy H. & Soundararajan, Vidhya, 2019. " Wage fairness in a subcontracted labor market ," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 24-42.

Most related items

  1. Marjit, Sugata & Mukherjee, Vivekananda & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2000. " Harassment, corruption and tax policy ," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 75-94, March.
  2. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2005. " Organized crime, corruption and punishment ," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1639-1663, September.

More about this item

Keywords

Statistics

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ids:ijepee:v:3:y:2010:i:3:p:237-252 . See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sarah Parker (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.inderscience.com/browse/index.php?journalID=219 .

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.